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FIDELITY TO NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
James E. Fleming*
INTRODUCTION
It is an honor and a pleasure to comment on Professor Robert P.
George's elegant and provocative paper.' For one thing, he is a
leading proponent of reviving the natural law tradition in political,
legal, and constitutional theory.2 For another, he was a reader of my
Ph.D. dissertation in constitutional theory at Princeton University
over a decade ago. I am happy to have the chance to reciprocate by
reading a work of his and providing a critique of it. Fortunately, I
learned at Princeton that vigorous criticism and disagreement are fully
compatible with friendship and respect.
I want to begin by observing a striking anomaly in George's
analysis. While reading his paper, I had to do a double take. I had to
ask myself, is George, a sophisticated proponent of a natural law
constitutional theory, actually embracing Justice Black's legal
positivist harangue against natural law in dissent in Griswold v.
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I wish to thank Sot Barber,
Charles Kelbey, Linda McClain, and Ben Zipursky for helpful comments concerning
this essay. I also am grateful to Russ Pearce, Ben Zipursky, and Gene Harper for
inviting me to be an inaugural commentator on Professor Robert P. George's
inaugural lecture in the Natural Law Colloquium at Fordham. I conceive my role in
this essay to be to comment on George's arguments about natural law, Griswold v.
Connecticut, and judicial review, not to offer my own justification of Griswold or my
own account of judicial enforcement of principles of natural law or natural rights in
constitutional interpretation.
1. Robert P. George, Natural Law, the Constitution, and the Theory and Practice
of Judicial Review, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2269 (2001).
2. George has written or edited a number of books advocating reviving the
natural law tradition. See, eg., Robert P. George, In Defense of Natural Law (1999);
Robert P. George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (1993);
Natural Law and Moral Inquiry (Robert P. George ed., 1998); Natural Law,
Liberalism, and Morality (Robert P. George ed., 1996); Natural Law Theory:
Contemporary Essays (Robert P. George ed., 1992). I recently also had the
opportunity to respond to another, fundamentally different, leading proponent of a
moral realist or natural law theory of constitutional interpretation, Michael Moore.
See James E. Fleming, The Natural Rights-Based Justification for Judicial Review, 69
Fordham L. Rev. 2119 (2001).
2285
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Connecticut?3 I can certainly understand why a positivist like Robert
Bork would revel in Black's trashing of natural law.' I never thought,
however, I would see the day when an able defender of natural law
would embrace Black's dissent which, along with Justice Iredell's
opinion in Calder v. Bull,5 is usually understood as a legal positivist
argument against the idea that the Constitution incorporates
principles of natural law or natural rights.6
George contends that "our Constitution embodies.., natural law
and natural rights,"7 but tries to claim that it "places primary authority
for giving effect to natural law and protecting natural rights to the
institutions of democratic self-government, not to the Courts."8 This
anomaly provides a clue as to what is going on in his essay. George
calls his position a determination of prudence.' I would call it by a
different name, which, like prudence, also begins with "p"- politics."'
But I am getting ahead of myself.
My comment, like George's paper, has three parts. The first part
will point out some problems with George's analysis of what he calls
"the Griswold problem." The second part discusses his critique of
Edward S. Corwin's argument concerning how American
constitutional law is indebted to the natural law tradition. Finally, and
most importantly, the third part assesses George's claim that the
Constitution embodies natural law and natural rights but leaves their
enforcement to legislatures, not courts.
I. THE GRISWOLD PROBLEM
Again, it is remarkable that George seems to embrace Justice
Black's critique in dissent in Griswold of "the natural law due process
philosophy."'" According to Justice Black, it is specious to maintain
that the Constitution incorporates natural law. For Black, to call a
decision or doctrine the product of natural law reasoning is to
condemn and discredit it as beyond the pale. Indeed, in Black's
constitutional lexicon, there is no more contemptible epithet to hurl at
3. See George, supra note 1, at Part I. (analyzing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965)).
4. See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 95-100 (1990) (criticizing
Griswold but praising the dissent of Justice Black).
5. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398-99 (1798) (Iredell, J., dissenting).
6. See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, The Bicentennial of Calder v. Bull: In Defense of a
Democratic Middle Ground, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 1599 (1998).
7. George, supra note 1, at 2282.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2279-80.
10. I do not mean politics in a crude or pejorative sense, but in the sense that his
position reflects political judgments about what institutions are most likely to realize
his particular conservative conception of natural law.
11. Id. at Part I.
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a position than "natural law"-except perhaps "Lochner" and in
Black's mind, the two are one and the same.'2
It is also notable that George evidently endorses Black's
characterization of Lochner as a product of natural law reasoning.13 It
is notable because, in doing so, he acquiesces in Black's tarring of
natural law with the brush of Lochner, that dreaded, infamous case.
Notwithstanding George, one might expect most natural lawyers to
defend the dignity and honor of natural law against Black's critique. I
shall mention three possible avenues of defense. One way would be
to argue that Black's understanding of natural law and natural rights is
embarrassingly crude, and that Lochner, rightly understood, does not
embody reasoning from natural law or natural rights at all. On this
view, Lochner may well read a problematic economic or political
theory into the Constitution, but not as a matter of natural law or
natural rights. Another move would be to argue that, even if Lochner
does reflect natural law or natural rights reasoning, its reasoning is
erroneous. Contra Lochner, natural law or natural rights, properly
understood, do not embody an anti-paternalistic theory of laissez faire
capitalism or Social Darwinism. Still another way to defend the honor
and dignity of natural law or natural rights against Black's critique
would be to argue that Lochner does indeed reflect natural law or
natural rights reasoning, and that the majority in Lochner got the
content of natural law or natural rights right. 4 On this view, natural
law or natural rights, rightly understood, indeed do embody a
vigorous conception of liberty of contract and do impose anti-
paternalistic limitations upon the police power of the states and the
powers of Congress. On all three views, Black is fundamentally wrong
in his critique of natural law reasoning in constitutional interpretation.
In contrast, George reports Black's critique of natural law and
natural rights and defends a variation on Black's position! To be fair,
George refines Black's position. He claims that it is possible to
believe that the Constitution does embody natural law or natural
rights, and still agree with Black that judges have no authority to
enforce natural law or natural rights against legislative encroachment.
One may well be able to hold this position, but not without throwing
out much of Black's skeptical critique of the very idea that the
Constitution embodies natural law or natural rights.'" Why would
12. See Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479,522-24 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the "natural law due process philosophy" of Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905)).
13. See George, supra note 1, at 2271-72.
14. See, e.g., Hadley Arkes, The Return of George Sutherland: Restoring a
Jurisprudence of Natural Rights (1994).
15. That is, Black criticized the majority opinion in Griswold, not because he
believed the Constitution embodied natural law but because he opposed judicial
enforcement of it. He criticized the very idea that the Constitution embodied natural
law. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting).
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George adopt this argument? It appears he has made the prudential,
that is, political judgment that it is worth doing in order to damn
Griswold, Roe v. Wade,6 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey17 as
illegitimate instances of Lochner-style natural law judging. 18
I want to make four points about George's analysis of Griswold
itself. First, George obstinately and proudly goes against the grain of
our constitutional practice by continuing to criticize Griswold as
wrongly decided. Elsewhere, I have argued that Griswold, like Brown
v. Board of Education,19 has become a "fixed star in our constitutional
constellation."2  Brown in the 1950s, and Griswold in the 1960s,
provoked methodological crises in constitutional law. Yet like Brown,
Griswold today is a case that any nominee to the Supreme Court must
say was rightly decided in order to stand a chance of being confirmed.
Thus, after the Senate's rejection of Robert Bork, Justices Kennedy,
Souter, and Thomas in their confirmation hearings were as scrupulous
about saying that they recognized a constitutional right of privacy and
accepted Griswold as they were about declining to say whether they
recognized a right to abortion and accepted Roe.z" More generally, as
with Brown, so with Griswold, any constitutional theory, to be
publicly acceptable, has to entail that it was rightly decided. So one
might just as well rail against Brown as against Griswold.
Second, George states, "[i]n the end, Douglas' opinion [in
Griswold] rests on the essentially undefended assertion that the
availability of contraceptives is good for the institution of marriage."2
This is erroneous. Douglas' opinion instead rests on two fundamental
propositions concerning the institution of marriage. First, it would be
destructive to the marriage relationship if we allowed "the police to
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
18. It is common for conservatives to blast Roe and Casey as illegitimate instances
of "Lochnering." See, e.g, Casey, 505 U.S. at 998 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part); Roe, 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Some scholars have defended Griswold, Roe, and Casey (as distinguished
from Lochner) on the basis of natural law or natural rights arguments. See, e.g.,
Charles A. Kelbey, Natural Law and the Supreme Court (unpublished manuscript on
file with author).
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 13
(1995) (drawing an analogy to West Virginia State Bd. Of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943)).
21. See 1 Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong. 225, 364 (1991); Nomination of David H. Souter to be Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Conlin.
on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 172-76 (1990); Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 135-36, 164-65 (1987). Even Scalia strains to say
that Griswold was rightly decided according to his conception of the due process
inquiry. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion).
22. George, supra note 1, at 2273 n.20.
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search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of
the use of contraceptives." 2 As Douglas added, "[t]he very idea is
repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage
relationship."'24 Second, the marriage relationship or association
deserves special protection because it is "intimate to the degree of
being sacred" and "it is an association for as noble a purpose as any
involved in our prior decisions" such as those protecting freedom of
association for political, social, legal, and economic purposes.,,
Neither of these propositions, contra George, rests on the truth or
falsehood, as an empirical or moral matter, of the assertion that the
availability of contraceptives is good for the institution of marriage.
Together, though, the two propositions lead to another proposition:
it is good that the partners of the marital association have the privacy
and the freedom to make important decisions about whether or when
to have children.'
I happen to think, as an empirical and moral matter, that the right
of privacy, including the right to use contraceptives, is good for the
institution of marriage. I do not believe that marriage would be an
institution worth preserving in its present form if no such rights
existed. Indeed, in a toast at my own wedding ceremony, I read from
the stirring final passages from Douglas' opinion in Griswold that I
just quoted. In fact, I believe that marriage is such a good thing that it
ought to be made available to all, heterosexuals and homosexuals
alike.27
Third, George also characterizes as a "remarkable proposition" the
argument in Douglas' first draft of the Griswold opinion, which would
have invalidated the Connecticut statute on the ground that it violated
the right to freedom of association? This proposition not only is not
remarkable, it also is eminently sound. In fact, the Supreme Court
subsequently adopted that ground for the right at issue in Griswold.9
Kenneth Karst, elaborating upon the language from Douglas's
opinion concerning freedom of association, put forward a famous
justification for the right recognized in Griswold in terms of "The
Freedom of Intimate Association. 30 (An article whose title nicely
encapsulates its argument.) The Supreme Court essentially adopted
Karst's analysis in an important case regarding freedom of association,
23. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965).
24. Id. at 485-86.
25. Id. at 486.
26. I have defended such an interpretation of Griswold in terms of a theme of
"deliberative autonomy." See Fleming, supra note 20, at 10-14.
27. See, eg., Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
28. George, supra note 1, at 2273-74 n. 21.
29. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
30. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale Li. 624
(1980).
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Roberts v. Jaycees.31 There the Court characterized Griswold and
related cases protecting personal liberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment in terms of "freedom of intimate association," 32 just as it
characterized NAACP v. Alabama and related cases under the First
Amendment in terms of "freedom of expressive association." 33
Fourth and finally, I want to point out the irony in George siding
with Justice Iredell and against Justice Chase in the Calder debate.
That exchange is conventionally framed as a debate between the
natural law jurisprudence of Chase and the legal positivism of
Iredell?4 Beyond that, it is striking that George says that "the
questions at issue [in the Calder debate] involved nothing like the
Griswold problem. ' 35  He states that Calder v. Bull concerned
"whether courts could overrule legislative acts which plainly violated
'vital principles' that, though not expressly stated, were presupposed
by the very institutions of 'free republican government."'36 This is
striking for several reasons. First, in Griswold, Justice Black and
Justice Harlan thought that the debate in Calder between Iredell and
Chase concerning the vital principles of free republican government
was clearly on point-Black played Iredell to Harlan's Chase. Black
relied on the words of Iredell to argue that the Constitution does not
protect the right of privacy because it is not expressly mentioned in
the text,37 and Harlan quoted from Chase to argue that the right of
privacy is a constitutional right even though it is not specifically
enumerated in the text. 8 Furthermore, many scholars, including
myself, have argued that the right to privacy, conceived as a right to
autonomy, is, in Chase's formulation, a vital principle of free
republican government.39
II. CORWIN ON NATURAL LAW AND AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM
George's particular critique of Corwin -that both common law and
legislation depend not only on authority but also on reason-is
sound."n But Corwin's larger argument is sound and withstands
George's critique. In our constitutional tradition, judicial review is
31. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
32. Id. at 617-19.
33. Id. at 618.
34. See, e.g., Foley, supra note 6; Kelbey, supra note 18.
35. George, supra note 1, at 2279.
36. Id. (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386,388 (1798) (Chase, J.)).
37. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 524-25 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting)
(quoting Calder, 3 U.S. at 399 (Iredell, J, dissenting.)).
38. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (incorporating by reference his dissent in
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Calder, 3
U.S. at 388 (Chase, J.)).
39. See, e.g, Fleming, supra note 20, at 25-26.
40. See George, supra note 1, at Part II.
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not limited to interpretation and enforcement of textual provisions
understood as if they were sections of a detailed code."
I would press a different, more fundamental argument concerning
Corwin's analysis. I am dubious about any argument that treats our
historical practices-whether the common law, statutory law, or even
constitutional law-as the deposit of natural law or natural rights. I
would argue that natural law or natural rights inherently provide a
normative standard for criticizing our historical practices, including
the common law, statutory law, and constitutional law of our country.
The best evidence for the appropriateness of this critical attitude is the
course of human history, including that of American history, which is
strewn with both atrocities committed against, and appalling neglect
for, basic human rights, dignity, and needs. And so, we should be
skeptical about any theory that treats our historical practices or laws
themselves as the repository of natural law or natural rights.
For this reason, we should also be wary of any attempt-like that of
Scalia-to reduce the liberties fundamental to our constitutional
traditions to whatever specific rights have long been recognized in our
historical practices as expressed in the common law and the statute
books.42 Our historical practices surely have failed to realize and
vindicate the fundamental liberties of our constitutional traditions.
We should understand our traditions, not as historical practices, but as
aspirational principles that are deeply critical of our historical
practices.4 3 Aspirational principles are principles to which we as a
people aspire-and for which we as a people stand-even though we
have failed to realize them in our historical practices. Our
aspirational principles are more akin to principles of natural law or
natural rights than are our historical practices, including our statutory
law, common law, and constitutional law.
III. NATURAL LAW AND THE "'GRISWOLD PROBLEM"
George contends that "natural law itself does not settle the question
of whether it falls ultimately to the legislature or the judiciary in any
particular polity to insure that the positive law conforms to natural
law and respects natural rights."'  His contention is correct. As I
would put it, we should distinguish between the following two
fundamental interrogatives of constitutional interpretation: What is
the Constitution? and Who may authoritatively interpret it? 5 To
41. Edward S. Corwin, The Debt of American Constitutional Law to Natural Law
Concepts, 25 Notre Dame Law. 258 (1949-50).
42. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123-27, 127 n.6 (1989)
(plurality opinion).
43. I have developed this distinction elsewhere. James E. Fleming, Constructing
the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211,268-73 (1993).
44. George, supra note 1, at 2279.
45. For a work that conceives the enterprise of constitutional interpretation on the
2291
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
elaborate the distinction: The answer to the question, What does the
Constitution include? -for example, text expressing specific rules only
or text embodying abstract principles of natural law or natural
rights-does not determine the answer to the question Who, as
between legislatures and courts, may authoritatively interpret and
enforce the Constitution, whatever it includes.
The classical, interpretive justification for judicial review, put
forward in The Federalist No. 7846 and Marbury v. Madison,47 is a
famous answer to the Who question. Courts are obligated to interpret
the higher law of the Constitution and to preserve and enforce it
against encroachments by the ordinary law of legislation. This
justification is agnostic as between the following two competing
answers to the What question. The first is a legal positivist conception
advanced by Bork, Scalia, and Black. 8 On this view, the Constitution
is basically a code of detailed rules. It excludes abstract moral
principles, including abstract principles of natural law or natural
rights. The second answer is a moral realist or natural rights
conception put forward by Michael Moore and Sotirios A. Barber; 9 I
will lump their conception in with Ronald Dworkin's idea of a "moral
reading of the Constitution. ''50  These theorists believe the
Constitution embodies a scheme of abstract moral principles, which,
with some simplification, we can say are principles of natural rights."
Thus, the important question becomes What is the Constitution?, as
well as What does it include? In particular, which of the two foregoing
general answers is superior?
basis of these two fundamental interrogatives - along with a third, How should the
Constitution be interpreted? - see Walter F. Murphy, James E. Fleming & Sotirios A.
Barber, American Constitutional Interpretation (2d ed. 1995).
46. The Federalist No. 78, at 467, 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
47. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
48. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); Hugo LaFayette Black, A
Constitutional Faith (1969); Bork, supra note 4; Antonin Scalia, A Matter of
Interpretation (1997) [hereinafter A Matter of Interpretation]; Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989) [hereinafter Originalism].
49. See, e.g., Sotirios A. Barber, The Constitution of Judicial Power (1993)
[hereinafter Judicial Power]; Sotirios A. Barber, On What the Constitution Means
(1984); Michael S. Moore, Justifying the Natural Law Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2087 (2001); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law
Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 279 (1985); Michael S. Moore, The
Semantics of Judging, 54 S. Cal. L. Rev. 151 (1981).
50. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the
American Constitution (1996) [hereinafter Freedom's Law]; Ronald Dworkin, The
Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 Fordham L. Rev.
1249 (1997) [hereinafter Arduous Virtue].
51. I say "with some simplification" because Dworkin speaks of the Constitution
as embodying abstract moral principles rather than natural rights as such.
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Narrow originalists like Bork and Scalia have asserted a monopoly
on the classical, interpretive justification of judicial review and on
concern for fidelity in constitutional interpretationY- Again, they
offer the foregoing legal positivist answer to the question What does
the Constitution include. They side with Black in Griswold and
Iredell in Calder. The Constitution consists of the text only, which
should be understood as a code of detailed rules, and it excludes
natural law or natural rights (and, more generally, any conception of a
scheme of abstract principles). For them, the classical, interpretive
justification of judicial review requires judges to interpret and enforce
the Constitution so understood. And for them, fidelity to the
Constitution so understood forbids judicial interpretation and
enforcement of principles of natural law or natural rights.53
Dworkin, Moore, and Barber have challenged the narrow
originalists' pretensions to a monopoly on the classical, interpretive
justification of judicial review and on concern for fidelity in
constitutional interpretation. They have sought to reclaim and
reconstruct the classical, interpretive justification with their own
conceptions of the Constitution and fidelity. ' They roughly side with
Douglas in Griswold and Chase in Calder. The Constitution includes
the text, but they understand the text as embodying a scheme of
abstract moral principles including (for the sake of argument)
principles of natural rights. And so, for them, the classical,
interpretive justification of judicial review entails that judges should
interpret and enforce the Constitution so understood. And fidelity to
the Constitution so understood requires judicial interpretation and
enforcement of abstract moral principles including natural rights.
George's move is different from that of the narrow originalists.
First, he argues, contrary to the narrow originalists, that "the fabric
and theory of our Constitution embodies our founders' belief in
natural law and natural rights."55  Second, he apparently wants to
invoke the classical, interpretive justification of judicial review.'
Nonetheless, he wants to conclude, like the narrow originalists, that
judges interpreting and enforcing the Constitution should not
interpret and enforce principles of natural law or natural rights. As he
puts it, "I do not draw from this [conception of the Constitution as
52. Bork, supra note 4; A Matter of Interpretation, supra note 48; Originalism,
supra note 48. Elsewhere, I have criticized the narrow originalists' claim to have a
monopoly on concern for fidelity in constitutional interpretation. James E. Fleming,
Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 Fordham L- Rev. 1335 (1997); James E.
Fleming, Original Meaning Without Originalisin, 85 Geo. LJ. 1849 (1997).
53. Bork, supra note 4, at 66, 209-10, 351-55; A Matter of Interpretation, supra
note 48; Originalism, supra note 48.
54. See, e.g., Judicial Power, supra note 49, at 157-58; Freedom's Law, supra note
50, at 72-83.
55. George, supra note 1, at 2282.
56. Id
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embodying our founders' belief in natural law and natural rights] the
conclusion that judges have broad authority to go beyond the text,
structure, logic, and original understanding of the Constitution to
invalidate legislation that, in the opinion of judges, is contrary to
natural justice."57  He also writes, "Black, Bork, Scalia, and other
'textualists' and 'originalists' are nearer the mark, in my judgment, in
calling for judicial restraint in the absence of a clear constitutional
warrant for overturning duly enacted legislation."58
Yet because of George's conception of What the Constitution
includes, he cannot embrace the narrow originalist conclusion unless
he offers a justification for judicial review besides the classical,
interpretive justification. George argues from a conception of What is
the Constitution like Dworkin's (rather than Bork's)-through a
justification of judicial review that is agnostic between a conception of
What like Dworkin's and a conception of What like Bork's-to a
conclusion or conception of judicial review like Bork's (as
distinguished from Dworkin's). But again, he cannot reach that
conclusion without a "noninterpretive" justification of judicial
review. 9 For the classical, interpretive justification of judicial review
offers no justification for judges' to refrain from enforcing any
provision, part, or aspect of the Constitution. Instead, it says,
interpret and enforce the Constitution, whatever it is. And so, if the
Constitution embodies principles of natural law and natural rights,
that justification entails that judges should interpret and enforce those
principles.
To be sure, there are alternative "noninterpretive" justifications for
judicial review that might support George's conclusion that principles
of natural law and natural rights, although incorporated into the
Constitution, should not be judicially enforced. But in this paper at
least, he has not put forward any such alternative justification. He
does say, "[A]s I read the document, [the Constitution] places primary
authority for giving effect to natural law and protecting natural rights
to the institutions of democratic self-government, not to the Courts." 60
He continues, "[i]t is primarily for the state legislatures, and, where
power has been duly delegated under the Constitution, to the
Congress to fulfill the task of making law in harmony with the
requirements of morality (natural law), including respect for valuable
and honorable liberties (natural rights). 61  He merely reports his
conclusion and does not argue for it.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Here I do not mean "noninterpretive" in the common pejorative sense that
one thinks another's theory of interpretation is not really a theory of "interpretation"
at all. Rather, I mean it in the sense that the argument against judicial review reflects
or grows out of concerns that do not simply follow from a theory of interpretation.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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In his closing remarks about fidelity to the rule of law and the
Constitution, George suggests that proponents of judicial enforcement
of principles of natural law or natural rights have forsaken such
fidelity and instead have made a "bargain with the devil." 2 But it is
important to note, as just intimated, that he turns against his own
understanding of fidelity to the Constitution in order to argue against
judicial enforcement of such principles. To be sure, he can argue that
principles of natural law and natural rights embodied in the
Constitution should be interpreted and enforced by legislatures rather
than courts. But it will take an argument besides fidelity to get to that
conclusion.
Moreover, I dare say that several common arguments are not
available to George, given his general commitments. For example, he
surely would not make skeptical arguments: that even if the
Constitution incorporates natural law or natural rights, its content is
unknowable or so indeterminate that courts should ignore it or leave
it to legislatures to interpret and enforce it. He is hardly such a
skeptic. And he presumably would not make democratic arguments:
that even if the Constitution incorporates natural law or natural rights,
and even if judges can determine its content, courts should ignore it or
leave it to legislatures because it is in principle a good thing for our
constitutional democracy that legislatures give their own content to
natural law or natural rights. I doubt that he is such a democrat. For
example, I doubt that he would say that it is a good thing for
democracy for New York to decide that women have a natural right to
decide whether to terminate a pregnancy through having an abortion.
Finally, George might be able to argue, along the lines suggested by
the work of Lawrence G. Sager and Cass R. Sunstein, that the
Constitution incorporates principles of natural law or natural rights,
but these principles are properly understood as "judicially
underenforced norms."63 On these views, the fuller protection and
enforcement of such principles is secure with legislatures and
executives in "the Constitution outside the Courts."' But thus far
George has not made such an argument.
Such arguments against judicial interpretation and enforcement of
principles of natural law or natural rights might be good arguments,
but again, they are not arguments of fidelity that follow from the
classical, interpretive justification of judicial review. They are
arguments of policy or prudence that compromise, override, or
62. Id at 2283.
63. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution v-vi, 9-10, 138-40. 145-61,
350 (1993); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of
Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 410 (1993); Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure:
The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L Rev. 1212
(1978).
64. Sunstein, supra note 63, at 9-10.
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abandon the quest for fidelity in constitutional interpretation. Ronald
Dworkin pointed this out long ago in his book, Taking Rights
Seriously,' and recently reiterated it in his essay in the Fordham
symposium on the idea of fidelity in constitutional interpretation.66 I
certainly do not deny that George might be able to make
"noninterpretive" or "non-fidelity" arguments for his conclusion that
courts should not interpret and enforce principles of natural law or
natural rights that he himself believes the Constitution embodies.
Rather, I wish to emphasize two points. One, George has not made
such arguments. And two, I hope to have punctured the pretensions
that manifest themselves in his charge that the theorists with whom he
disagrees concerning natural law or natural rights have made a
"bargain with the devil" in disregard of fidelity to the rule of law and
the Constitution.
In closing, I want to point out that charging that one's theoretical
disputants have made a "bargain with the devil" is a game that both
sides can play. I could argue that fidelity to the Constitution imposes
on judges a duty in justice to give full meaning to the Constitution's
charter of liberty, rather than giving in to the temptation to abdicate
responsibility by recourse to narrow originalism or to deference to
state legislatures. 67 I could argue that Bork, Scalia, and George have
made a bargain with the devil by succumbing to versions of the latter
temptation. My more general point is that no one proposes breaking
with fidelity to the Constitution (as they understand it) in order to
achieve the results that they desire. Rather, everyone argues that
fidelity to the Constitution, rightly understood, requires the results
that they believe are constitutionally sound. Thus, we return to the
fundamental question, what is the best understanding of What is the
Constitution?, and what is the best understanding of fidelity in
constitutional interpretation.
65. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 131-49 (1977).
66. Arduous Virtue, supra note 50, at 1249-51, 1262-68.
67. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-49, 901 (1992);
Freedom's Law, supra note 50, at 72-83, 119, 124-29.
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